Introduction
Pricing strategies for parcels delivery from e-commerce remain a hot topic for postal and parcel delivery operators. As shown by Borsenberger (2015) , the e-commerce sector is subject to concentration trends, due to a fierce price competition between e-retailers, the existence of increasing returns to scale in e-commerce activity, the importance of e-retailers' reputation to attract consumers. This phenomenon is reinforced by the development of 'marketplaces', which represent virtual intermediate platforms between e-retailers and e-consumers. Marketplaces have developed a win-win intermediation model. Consumers enjoy a greater variety of products (long-tail) and affiliated merchants take advantage of the marketplace's ability to generate huge online traffic and to provide a powerful showcase. 1 Affiliation to a marketplace presents also some drawbacks for e-retailers. These include fierce price competition leading to reduced margins, the dilution of their own identity and brand to the benefit of the marketplace and in a worst case scenario the creation of a relation of dependence.
The concentration phenomenon raises specific concerns for parcel delivery operators, as input providers for e-retailers. Big e-retailers could have substantial power to negotiate attractive commercial terms for the provision of parcel delivery services in a market characterized by fixed costs and returns to scale. Specifically, this may lead to volume-discount pricing schemes.
This trend is exacerbated by the fact that the major marketplaces provide delivery services to their affiliated merchants. 2 They become a sort of parcel aggregators, maximizing the volume of parcels provided to delivery operators, in order to increase their quantity discounts.
To put further pressure on parcel delivery operators, big e-retailers like Amazon are developing their own delivery network in dense areas, threatening to bypass traditional delivery operators. 1 The activity of marketplaces is growing in all countries where e-commerce is well-developed. In 2013, 2 million sellers were affiliated to Amazon's marketplace around the world, selling more than 1 billion items. In France, according to Oxatis (2014) , 32 percent of e-retailers sold their goods through marketplaces in 2013. According to the FEVAD (2014), the volume of sales realized in marketplaces increased by 42 percent in the last quarter 2013 and represented 16 percent of the global activity of these e-retailers. The five first most visited e-commerce sites in France were marketplaces. 2 For example, Amazon proposes to its affiliated merchants the service 'Fulfilment by Amazon' (FBA). Merchants pay fees for the various services provided by Amazon: handling the order, picking and packing products, shipping the order (fees depending on the parcel weight and size and the value of order; see Appendix A). Rakuten.com offer a similar storage and shipping service to merchants affiliated to its marketplace: Rakuten Super Logistics (RSL).
In this paper, we examine the link between the delivery rates charged by postal and other parcel delivery operators and the e-commerce market structure. What is the impact of the existence of a marketplace (vs. the presence of independent e-retailers) on the delivery rates and on the economic surplus? Could a delivery operator prevent the development of a marketplace with an appropriate pricing strategy? Which is the best situation from the point of view of the various economic agents (e-retailers, delivery operators, final consumers)?
To answer these questions, we develop a formal model, in Section 2, in which we consider a stylized e-commerce sector with a single parcel delivery operator and two retailers, indexed 0 and 1. Retailer 0 is a "big" retailer who also operates a marketplace platform, which sells retail and delivery services to other firms.
Initially, we assume that all items are delivered by the postal operator but we also consider the case where operator 0 has a bypass technology, at least in some areas. Retailer 1 can sell independently or via the other firm's marketplace. When it sells independently it uses the delivery services provided by the postal operator and pays the rate it charges. In case of marketplace affiliation it pays a fee to the other retailer who takes care of parcels delivery.
Joining the marketplace has other implications. It reduces the degree of product differentiation (so that competition intensity increases) and it increases the willingness to pay for retailer 1's product. This is because the retailers benefit from the reputation of the marketplace.
We study the case where the delivery operator sets the rates charged to each of the two sellers to maximize profits and also look at the Ramsey solution (maximization of welfare subject to a break-even constraint). All variables are evaluated in the induced subgame perfect equilibrium of the price competition game played by the retailers. Depending on the fee charged by the marketplace, operator 1 decides to join or not. In the last stage, the retailers then compete in prices either as independent retailers (Subgame I) or as marketplace sellers (Subgame M).
In Section 3, we determine analytically the solution to these games considering as reference scenario the case where all the players maximize their profits and the case where the postal operator maximizes social welfare. While we adopt the simplest possible model which is consistent with the main stylized features of the underlying problem, the analytical solutions are often quite complex. The interpretation is interesting in itself, but to obtain sharper conclusions we resort to numerical simulations in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Model
Consider an electronic retail market consisting of two sellers (e-retailers) located at 0 and 1 of the Hotelling line. Consumers are distributed over this line,
the distribution function and ( ) g z the density. The Hotelling specification is the simplest way to represent horizontal differentiation. In our setting, z is not meant to describe a geographical location but rather a parameter characterizing the individuals' preferences across retailers.
The retailers sell a single product which apart from their specific retail services is otherwise homogenous. Its marginal cost, excluding delivery is constant and denoted by k .
There is a single delivery operator, who charges a rate of 0 r to retailer 0 . For the time being bypass is ruled out but will be considered below. Seller 1 can either deliver directly via postal operator at rate r ; the general rate which also applies for single piece senders.
Alternatively, it can "join" the marketplace and use the delivery services of retailer 0 . This affects utility and also the degree of product differentiation. We will consider these two market configurations separately.
Independent delivery
In this case referred to as subgame I , the utility of consumer z , who buys x units of the good is given by   . Firm 0 is a "big" retailer, whose reputation translates into a higher quality perceived by the consumer, which is captured by  . Define indirect utility (consumer surplus)
The marginal consumer (
buy from seller 1. Solving for z  yields
Aggregate (market) demand for the two products is given by
Profits of the e-retailers are given by
The e-retailers simultaneously set their prices and the solution is given by the Nash equilibrium, denoted by the superscript NI . The equilibrium prices are then 
and equilibrium profits are ( 1 )
The postal operator's profits are given by
where F denotes the operator's fixed cost and where ( ) Y r is the demand for single piece delivery services (by household and other small firms). Formally we have
where ( ) S Y is the (aggregate) gross surplus of single-piece customers (other than e-retailers).
Marketplace delivery
In this case, referred to as subgame M , the utility of consumer z , who buys x units of the good is given by Proceeding as above, the marginal consumer is now determined by
and aggregate (market) demand for the two products is
where s is the shipping rate retailer 0 charges to retailer 1. As in the case of independent delivery we assume that the e-retailers simultaneously set their prices and that the solution is given by the Nash equilibrium, denoted by the superscript NM . The equilibrium prices are denoted by Finally, the postal operator's profits under marketplace delivery are given by
Comparing equations (12) and (18) shows that the total sales of both retailers are now delivered at the rate 0 r . The marketplace thus introduces a secondary market for delivery services which, even in the absence of bypass, restricts the operator's ability to differentiate prices.
Sequence of decision
The timing of the "full game" consisting of delivery and retail pricing is as follows. In Stage 1 the postal operator sets 0 r and r , to maximize welfare subject to the break-even constraint and anticipating the induced equilibrium. As usual we solve this game by backward induction to characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. At each stage the players (operator or retailers) anticipate the impact their choices will have on the equilibrium in the subsequent stages. Though highly stylized, our model is too complicated to provide a full analytical solution. However, some analytical results can be obtained and in any event a thorough examination of the various stages is necessary to
properly define the numerical solutions we will calculate in Section 4.
Equilibrium
We start by studying the last stage of the game. At this point retailer 1 has already decided if it delivers independently or via the marketplace. Consequently, the retailers play subgame I or subgame M . We shall examine them separately. Since we study the subgame perfect equilibrium, the comparative statics properties of these functions, in particular with respect to s are relevant to analyze the earlier stages of the game. This is not a trivial exercise because we have to study the equilibrium and not just differentiate the profit functions. However, we can expect that
in words, retailer 1's profit decreases as the delivery fee by the other retailer increases. This is what can be considered the "normal" case which will arise in the numerical examples presented below. The formal analysis which we skip shows, however, that the results are not unambiguous but that it would take strong assumptions to obtain a different result. 
Stage 3
At this stage, retailer 1 will decide whether or not to join the marketplace. To do so it will
, the retailer will choose independent delivery. Otherwise it will join the marketplace.
Note that for this comparison it is not sufficient to compare r and s ; this is because quality level and degree of product differentiation differ between the two subgames.
Assuming that (19) holds, there exists a critical level of s , 
Stage 2
Retailer 0 , the potential marketplace, sets s , the delivery rate charged to the other retailer. 
Stage 0
We are now in a position to state the problem of the postal operator who sets 0 ( ) r r  . As usual we consider a Ramsey problem where the postal operator maximizes welfare subject to a break-even constraint. Recall that this has profit maximization as a special case. 5 The operator's pricing policy 0 ( ) r r  will induce either the independent delivery or the marketplace equilibrium in the subsequent stages. Writing the objective function in a unified way for both regimes would complicate notation significantly. Consequently we write two separate problems, one for each regime. To determine the best policy one then has to compare 5 Formally the profit maximizing case is obtained by setting the profit target  at the monopoly level. Observe that in this case the Lagrange multiplier of the break even constraint will tend to infinity.
the level of the objective achieved at these solutions. Analytically this would be difficult but we address this issue in the numerical section.
We now successively consider the postal operator's problem in each of the two regimes.
Recall that maximization is over 0 ( ) r r  .
Regime I
The Lagrangean expression associated with the postal operator's problem is given by
Observe that the arguments of the functions 0  induce an equilibrium of type I in the subsequent stages.
Regime M
The Lagrangean expression associated with the postal operator's problem is now given by
Once again the arguments of the various functions have been dropped for simplicity. All 
Numerical illustrations
In this section, we provide numerical simulations whose aim is to illustrate qualitatively the characteristics of the equilibrium obtained with reasonable values of the parameters. A calibration of our model to a specific postal market would require a sizeable amount of empirical work to estimate its various constituents. We leave such a calibration exercise for future research.
We make use of the following values: We first describe the equilibrium in the model without bypass, before moving to its sensitivity to various assumptions, and finally to how it is affected by the introduction of bypass by firm 0.
Benchmark results
As in the previous sections, we solve the game by backward induction, starting with Stage 4.
We first present the numerical results obtained in subgame I where firm 1 chooses independent delivery. Table 1    ). We assume away fixed costs for the moment, so that all three firms exactly break even, and total welfare is composed exclusively of consumer surplus, denoted by CS. The results presented in Table 1 will help us ascertain the welfare properties of the market equilibrium, to which we now turn. Table 2 presents the market equilibrium with independent delivery by firm 1, as a function of the prices set by the postal operator, 0 r and r . More precisely, we assume from now on that r is set exogenously at 1. As the reader will see, the results we obtain are already rich and complex, and would be made significantly more complex (especially to report) with the postal operator optimizing on two price dimensions at the same time. As a first pass, we then set r exogenously and concentrate on the ratio between 0 r and r . Table 1 , we see that firm 0 makes use of its higher quality to raise its price above the one posted by firm 1, which results in a smaller market share than in Table 1 , and in smaller consumer surplus and total welfare. As its input price 0 r increases, firm 0 increases its retail price and moves further away from the first-best optimal allocation. We also see that prices 0 p and 1 p are strategic complements, although for this result is that a profit-maximizing postal operator would like to exploit the larger quality exhibited by firm 0, and that its only way to extract profit from firm 0 is to increase 0 r .
When the postal firm is maximizing welfare under a break-even constraint, the value of 0 r it chooses is increasing in its fixed cost F . As the postal operator cannot set a value of 0 r above 1 r  , its profit-maximizing price is 0 1 r  . We then see that the maximum value of the fixed cost compatible with breaking-even is 3.688.
We now turn to the equilibrium with marketplace. The second row of Table 1 shows the first-best allocation in that case. First-best prices are not affected, but the market share of firm 0 decreases to 70.93% due to the larger quality of the service offered by firm 1 when it uses firm 0's marketplace. The optimal quantity 1 x , consumer surplus and total welfare are higher than in the first row, while the value taken by s acts only as a transfer between firms 0 and 1.
The value of s is chosen at stage 2 by firm 0 in order to maximize its profit. We obtain, as surmised in Section 2, that 0 NM  is first increasing and then decreasing in s . We also obtain that the profit-maximizing value of s is much larger than 0 r and even than r , for all values of 0 r r  . The intuition for these results is that firm 0 anticipates that joining its marketplace will result in firm 1's higher quality and thus higher profit, and that s plays the role of an "access charge" to the marketplace. Also, increasing s induces firm 1 to increase its retail price, decreasing the intensity of competition with firm 0. These two reasons concur in pushing the value of s well above the marginal cost of delivery for firm 0 ( 0 r ) and even for firm 1 ( r ).
But firm 0 anticipates that it will realize this profit 0 We then report in Table 3 We now turn to the sensitivity analysis of these results.
Sensitivity analysis
We have studied the sensitivity of our results to variations in three assumptions: a larger exogenous value of r , a larger impact of joining the platform on the horizontal differentiation between the products offered by both firms (i.e., a lower value of  ) and on the quality of good 1 (i.e., a larger value of  ).
A natural question suggested by the numerical results presented in the previous section 6 We vary s by increments of 0.01 in our computations. The value of s reported in Table 3 are the highest for r r  , and it makes more profit than when r was set at one (so that Ramsey levels of 0 r are lower, for given F , when r is increased to 2.5). Consumer surplus and welfare remain larger at equilibrium (with the marketplace) than in the subgame with independent delivery by firm 1.
To summarize, a higher exogenous value of r induces an interior profit-maximizing value of 0 r when firm 1 delivers independently, but not in the equilibrium situation where firm 1 joins the marketplace, because it degrades the outside option of firm 1 and allows firm 0 to set a much higher level of the "access charge" s to its marketplace.
We now go back to the setting where 1 r  , but assume that joining the marketplace decreases the degree of differentiation between products more significantly. Specifically we set 0 5    rather than 0 8  . This change does not impact the equilibrium with independent delivery by firm 1, and thus its outside option. Less differentiation in the marketplace results in more intense competition, lower prices and lower profits for both firms for all values of 0 r . We continue to obtain limit pricing by firm 0 (so that Finally, we assume that joining the marketplace allows firm 1 to bridge most of the quality gap between its product and firm 0's (i.e., we set 1 09
   while returning to 1 r  and 0 8    ). This does not affect the equilibrium with independent delivery and the outside option of firm 1. In the marketplace, firm 0 increases its price s to very high levels up to the point
, and makes much larger profits than with independent delivery by firm 1. In other words, firm 0 can capture all the increase in firm 1's profit generated by a larger  by increasing the access charge s to the marketplace. The postal operator's profit remains monotonically increasing in 0 r . Interestingly, although total welfare remains higher with the marketplace than in the subgame with independent delivery, consumer surplus is lower: in equilibrium, firm 0 and the postal operator make larger profit, at the expense of consumer surplus, because higher equilibrium prices more than compensate the larger quality offered by firm 1 when it joins the marketplace. Intuitively, this occurs because only consumers who patronize seller 1 benefit from the higher quality, and they represent a small share, whereas all consumers support the price increase of both products.
Introduction of bypass
In this section, we revert to our original parameter values ( Table 4 shows the first-best allocation, with its first row devoted to the situation with independent delivery. The only difference with the first row of Table 1 Table 1 , but total welfare is higher by 0.75. lower. We obtain numerically that the value of 0 r which maximizes the postal operator's profit is 0.7. In words, the solution is interior and the price is lower than without bypass. The intuition is that an increase in 0 r decreases further the volumes delivered by the postal operator, compared to Table 2 , because it induces a larger amount of bypass. Table 5 : Independent delivery equilibrium with bypass 
Conclusion
This paper has examined the link between the delivery rates charged by parcel delivery operators and the e-commerce market structure. In particular, it has studied the impact of the parcel operators' pricing strategies on the e-retailers' incentives to develop a marketplace. It has considered a market where two e-retailers, a big one, 0, and a smaller one, 1 sell a homogenous good online.
Initially, all parcels are delivered by a postal operator. However, 0 may or may not offer its competitors the option to join its marketplace through the payment of an access fee.
Affiliation to the marketplace has several consequences for 1: (i) it reduces the degree of differentiation between the products, (ii) it increases the perceived quality of 1's product which in turn increases the consumers' willing to pay, and (iii) the marketplace consolidates the parcels send by 0 and 1 and could, in theory obtain better pricing conditions from the postal operator.
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Under the assumptions made in the numerical simulations, we obtain that a marketplace will emerge in equilibrium. This is good news for consumers: their surplus increase since the perceived quality of 1's product increases when it uses 0's marketplace services. Compared to the case where 1 remains independent, the welfare is also higher: 0 makes higher profits, 1 is indifferent between both situations, and the postal operator sets the same price in both cases and makes higher profits when there is a marketplace since demand increases.
The fact that the postal operator does not give any discount to 0 even though it is a bigger customer, with the more elastic demand, could appear counterintuitive in an industry characterized by scale economies and where volume discounts are a common practice. A sensitivity analysis shows that the latter result arises because the delivery rate charged to 1 is set at a rather low level. When it is fixed at a higher level, the postal operator concedes a discount to 0 in equilibrium.
Another sensitivity analysis shows that it is not always in the interest of 0 to offer its smaller competitor the possibility to join its marketplace. This is the case for instance if the affiliation to the marketplace reduces significantly the degree of differentiation between e-retailers products and therefore increases competition intensity, resulting in lower prices and lower profits for both firms. The result also emerges when 0's competitive advantage on delivery pricing (its bargaining power the postal operator) is not sufficiently important; in other words, when the discount offered by the postal operator to 0 is rather small. However, even in this case, it is in the interest of the postal operator to see a marketplace emerge, since this will have a positive impact on the volume of parcels to deliver. Consequently, the postal operator will set a price for parcel delivery such that 0 will find it profitable for 1 to join the marketplace.
Finally, when joining the marketplace has a sufficiently large impact on the perceived quality of 1's product, the emergence of a marketplace it is in the interest of both 0 and the postal operator. But, in this case, although total welfare remains higher with the marketplace than under independent delivery, consumer surplus is lower. As a matter of fact, only consumers who patronize 1 benefit from the higher quality, and they represent a small share, whereas all consumers support the price increase of both products.
In the last section of the paper, we consider the case where 0 is able to bypass the postal operator and deliver by itself part or all of its parcels. In accordance with intuition, the degree of bypass will depend on the rate charged by the postal operator. When it is above a certain threshold, 0 will deliver by itself all its parcels. Face with the threatened, the postal operator will give 0 a higher discount compared to the case where bypass is not available. Not surprisingly, bypass decreases the postal operator's profits.
A. Examples of fulfillment fees for orders on Amazon.com
Note that standard-size shipment, above $300, ordered on Amazon.com, are eligible for Zero Fee Fulfillment. Under $300, orders are subjected to fulfillment fees depending on their size and weight. Bypass does not modify the fundamental structure of the game but some expressions have to be modified. These are given in the following subsection.
B.1 Modified expressions under bypass
First, retailer 0 's profit has to be rewritten and equations (6) and (16) 
